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Many scholars have highlighted Japan and South Korea (hereafter, Korea) as 
distinctive models of the “developmental state”, which can share common 
features in terms of the condensed economic development.1 The close strategic 
relationship between the bureaucratic government and big businesses has 
been often cited as one of the many similarities in which the two countries 
pursued rapid economic growth.2 Another trend in comparing the modern 
economies of Korea and Japan highlights the state’s embedded autonomy 
in directing industrial transformation.3 Overall, scholarly interest in the 
comparison of the two Asian countries’ modernization has been, hitherto, 
limited to economic and political development, rather than focusing on social 
relations underlying the political economy of post-war development. 
Indeed, a comparative analysis of the similarities and differences in the his-
torical patterns of the emergence of “systems of interest intermediation” in 
dealing with labor in Japan and Korea is a relatively unexploited topic.4 There 
have only been a few attempts made at comparing the national bargaining 
arrangements among major interest groups and governments. Although some 
pioneering Japanese works introduce a corporatist account for its post-war 
labor relations5 and a historical analysis of negotiation characteristics of social 
contracts6, they all simply classify the Japanese case as an anomaly with the 
emphasis on the state’s deliberate management of weak labor forces. Like-
wise, the existing literature related to Korea’s labor politics and civil society 
tends to emphasize the uniqueness embedded in its social and industrial 
relations – the confrontation between “the strong state and the contentious 
society.”7 Thus, the dearth of comparative perspective in this area results in 
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creating the uniqueness as an exclusive dimension to delineate the political 
and social landscape of Korean and Japanese industrial relations.
Adding a comparative study of corporatist governance in Korea and Japan to 
the existing archival data on their industrial relations, I will assess different 
paths of the tripartite negotiation of adjustment in dealing with organized 
labor, and expand the comparative utility of the corporatist thesis to its East 
Asian variants. To this end, a profile of state-society relations will be advanced 
as a parameter to determine the characteristics of organized labor, ranging 
from confrontation to cooperation, in relation to the state and capital. A shift 
in the magnitude of organized labor results in transforming the tripartite 
pattern of interest negotiation, and the state, in turn, would design new in-
stitutional incentives to neutralize labor in civil society or embrace capital 
in big business. What must be explained are the two distinctive modes of 
Asian corporatism and how it varies according to the organized power of 
labor unions.   This is under the assumption that the tripartite negotiation in 
Korea, where the state faced strong challenges from organized labor, can be 
conceptualized as “corporatism without capital”, whereas Japan’s industrial 
relations are widely regarded as “corporatism without labor.” 
The Theoretical Utility of Corporatism 
The lack of any generally accepted concept of “corporatism” undermines 
a vigorous discussion of interest representation in terms of political strate-
gies for collective action. In literature, corporatism has a broad range of 
connotations varying according to different schools of conceptualization.8 
Nevertheless, the idea of corporatism has evolved on the common grounds 
of three analytical developments: the development of centralized interest 
organizations; the facilitation of associations’ access to the government and 
the growth of institutionalized linkages between government agencies and 
such interest organizations; and the tripartite enhancement of the social 
partnership of organized labor and business, which is designed to regulate 
conflicts between these groups, in coordination with government policy. 
Despite the fact that the ultimate definition of corporatism continues to be 
widely debated, most questions related to corporatism – the character of 
the prevalent political economy, the patterns of interest group organization 
and interest intermediation, and the systems of policymaking including the 
presence or absence of tripartite institutions, the active or passive nature of 
state intervention – converge on three related elements.9
Such a tripartite pattern of corporatist governance remains the most perva-
sive framework in explaining concerted prescriptions for social contracts. 
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For many scholars, one of its chief attractions lies in its tenets to overcome 
weaknesses in both the economic notions centered on free markets and in 
the political notions centered on pluralism.10 Historically, the corporatist 
solution, with its variations over time, has been long utilized as an effective 
institutional apparatus by which the state could occupy an intermediary 
position between liberal-pluralism and Marxian-totalitarianism or fascism.11 
Corporatism, on the one hand, advocates a strong, guiding, directing state but 
not one that is totalitarian at all. On the other hand, corporatism is normally 
characterized by state-structured and regulated interest groups, but neither 
by total control as in Marxism-Leninism nor by completely unregulated inter-
est-group struggle of liberal-pluralism. Under corporatism, a strong but not 
totalitarian state controls or licenses organized interest groups that are not 
only limited in number and functions but also part of the state in the name of 
social partnership. In other words, corporatism seeks to eliminate conflict by 
basing social integration around core interest groupings seen to be the basis 
of civil society. The primary utility of corporatism, therefore, represents the 
enhancement of the state’s governability on labor and business whereby its 
aim is to deal with problems of economic management and to co-opt labor 
for the purpose of legitimate wages.12 In a similar sense, opponents of the 
neo-liberal thesis in an era of globalization advance the state’s centralization 
of coordinated markets as a critical alternative to the contemporary capital-
ism characterized by decentralization.13
Another utility of the corporatist thesis results from its comparability and 
the conceptual flexibility. A considerable variety of regimes can fall under 
the corporatist category when the following three conditions are fulfilled in 
whole or in part: (i) the society is organized not on an individualistic basis, but 
in terms of the societal or corporate units such as labor unit or other interest 
groups14; (ii) the state seeks to structure, limit, or license these groups as a way 
of controlling them; and (iii) the state attempts to incorporate interest groups 
into the state system whereas these groups seek both to take advantage in 
terms of benefits for their memberships from such incorporation, and at the 
same time to preserve some degree of autonomy from the state. Corporatist 
cases satisfying these conditions or its variations are not only widespread 
but also ubiquitous in a flexible fashion and stretching out even in countries 
previously thought to be strongly in the liberal-pluralist mode. In Canada 
and the United States, organized labor has at best enjoyed limited control 
over the government; in Britain and Germany, labor’s inclusion in interest 
intermediation has been more regular with recurring election victories by 
the Labor or Social Democratic Parties; in Norway and Sweden, direct influ-
ence of organized labor has been institutionalized as a key factor in deciding 
social and labor policies. Similarly, despite not a typical format of corporat-
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ism, one can find the germs of corporatist society in Japan and Korea in the 
sense that the Confucian, non-individualist, and organized entities of labor or 
business can be encompassed by corporatist relations in which governments 
of both countries allow these societal actors to participate in the process of 
policymaking in return for their domination in governing and guiding the 
general direction of industrial relations. 
In a nutshell, comparative studies of corporatism in modern industrialized 
countries require a considerable degree of understandings of state-society 
relations as analytical foundations on which a specific framework of corporat-
ist governance can be built.15 Corporatist governance can be underpinned as 
an edification of state-society links in which the state and organized interest 
groups are mutually constitutive (or exclusive) in accordance with historical 
contingencies.
State-Society Relations as a Parameter in Comparing Japan and Korea 
Considering state-society links as a denominator common to both countries, 
dialectic attempts to describe the relational pattern between the state and 
society, even in a broader term, help us understanding different trajectories of 
the corporatist development in Japan and Korea before we take a close look 
at each case respectively. Simply put, while a symbiotic relationship between 
the state and civil society is more likely to generate a cooperative form of 
corporatism, a simplistic, oppositional relationship triggers interest groups 
in civil society to reject the state’s policies. Indeed, the existence of a specific 
type of state-society relation is seen as a necessary condition to determine 
the corporatist utility in comparing the influence of organized labor as well 
as the state’s capacity of governing civil society in Korea and Japan.16 
The state of civil society in Japan is particularly identified with ‘social part-
ners’ targeted and molded by permissive (or active) state.17 Dating back to the 
Meiji Revolution of 1868, the powerful emperor-system state crushed or co-
opted popular movements in the name of protecting society from capitalists’ 
harmful pursuit of self-interest as well as from socialists and other progres-
sives, and further promoted a particular pattern of voluntary organizations. 
Some observers, such as Karel van Wolferen, argue that imperial governance 
bequeathed legacies to post-war Japan in the form of a submissive middle 
class, and co-opted labor, and women’s movement.18 Still others attempt to tell 
the story of not only the democratic activities of the people, contrasted with 
conservative elites, but also the presence of an early modern public sphere 
during the Meiji period.19 The Allied Occupation of Japan (1945-1952) headed 
by the United States introduced a series of democratic reforms aimed at not 
only promoting the independence of civil society, but severing the longstand-
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ing conservative ties between the Japanese state and popular associations. 
Under the Trade Union Law of 1945, for example, Japanese workers gained 
the long-sought rights to organize unions and collective bargaining. Civic 
coalitions among leftist parties, labor unions and intellectuals in the wake of 
the so-called 1960 Anpo took the lead of the opposition to the 1960 revision 
of the US-Japan Security Treaty. The expansion of Japan’s post-war civil so-
ciety notwithstanding, historical legacies of state intervention into popular 
associations and everyday life in Japan tamed and molded the burgeoning 
civic groups into supporting right-wing nationalism and being not in the 
least interested in advocating the autonomy of civil society. The case of the 
Nonprofit Organization Law of 1998 also reveals that the social foundation 
for Japan’s regulatory regime comes from interest groups that are often co-
opted or incorporated by bureaucratic supervision.20 In this context, Japan’s 
state-civil society linkages, characterized by bureaucratic primacy, ministerial 
jurisdiction over civic groups, and interest groups as an extended arm of the 
state, provide a background for the “weak labor thesis” noting that decen-
tralized labor unions in civil society are deliberately utilized or sidelined by 
the state’s corporatist governance.
In marked contrast to the Japanese experience, Korea’s historical paths of 
state-society relations have been unevenly shaped by the continuing confron-
tation structure between a “strong state and contentious society”, as Hagen 
Koo aptly put it.21 Although the state has exerted coercive power in setting 
the dominant direction and framework of social transformation in Korea, 
actual processes of social and political change have not been determined 
solely by the state’s directives but completed by a considerable degree of civic 
or labor engagements in politics, which played a critical role in challenging 
and reshaping state policies.22 Thus, the most salient character of state-society 
relations in contemporary Korea is that despite the state’s unusual strength 
and pervasive presence, civil society in Korea has always contained both 
elements of strong resistance to state power and violent eruptions of social 
forces. In fact, the balance of power between the state and society, during the 
period of rapid economic growth after the early 1960s, shifted absolutely in 
favor of the former. Authoritarian regimes – the Park Chung Hee and Chun 
Doo Hwan governments – pursued economic growth for the sake of their 
own regimes’ legitimacy, and shaped the organizational form and agenda of 
social movements, thereby retarding the promotion of organized labor and 
popular movements against “despotic power”, in Michael Mann’s terms.23 
However, the very centralization of state power which was intended to exert 
control over civil society, ironically, had the perverse effect that the strong 
state began to lose control over politics and its legitimacy was eroded by the 
political backlash from the combined resistance of civil society organizations.24 
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Indeed, the merging of the working-class movement and the people’s move-
ment in the early 1980s resulted in the arrival of the democratic transition 
of 1987.25 After the civil uprising in the summer of 1987, the number of civic 
and voluntary associations mushroomed and civil society had grown larger 
and stronger, with heightened interest in broader political participation. This 
critical transition in Korea pushed the democratic governments to attempt 
to set in motion the corporatist governance whose underlying rationale was 
how to neutralize assertive voices of organized interest groups including 
labor unions. In short, it is fair to state that the development of state-society 
relations in Korea shows a good case of the “strong labor thesis” in the sense 
that the presence of assertive and militant labor forces in the democratized 
society facilitated the corporatist accommodation from the strong state. 
The parameter moving along the power balance between the state and 
society, therefore, is of great use to assess and decide the relative power of 
organized labor in relations to state control over labor forces through interest 
intermediation in the form of corporatism. 
The Development of Corporatism in Post-War Japan 
Corporatism-without-labor
The weak labor thesis embedded in Japan’s state-society links provides a 
category of social dialogue which is useful for understanding a variation in 
corporatism, which has been usually viewed as corporatism without full-
scale participation by organized labor.26 Some ILO data related to labor’s 
strikes in the three decades support the weak labor thesis (see table 1). The 
number of strikes, participants in strikes, and work-day lost due to strikes 
are all decreasing, except for the first oil crisis in the mid-1970s. Moreover, 
total union membership plummeted from 55.8 percent of the labor force in 
1947 to 24 percent in June 1992. This data indicates that the post-war Japanese 
labor movement had become less militant, thereby increasing the possibility 
of more cooperative bargaining structures for the interplay of quasi-tripar-
tite actors. These structures permitted some coordination and planning of 
social and economic policies, but they had so far kept labor federations at 
a distance. Under the strength of the state bureaucracy, the business com-
munity enjoyed a privileged position in the definition and implementation 
of public policy. 
Historically, the notion of “corporatism-without-labor” originates from the 
symbiotic coalition of the state bureaucracy and industrialists in big business 
(zaibatsu) in the period of the Meiji Restoration, which pursued a forceful 
industrialization policy built on the sacrifices of the agriculture sector, small 
business and workers.28 While this coalition systematically excluded labor 
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Table 1.  Strikes and Lock-outs in Japan, 1970-200011
1970 1974 1980 1990 1997 2000
Number of strikes & 
lock-outs 2,260 5,211 1,133 284 178 118
Workers involved 
(thousands) 1,720.1 2,236.1 562.9 84.3 47.2 15.3
Work-day not worked 
(thousands) 3,914.8 9,662.9 1,001.2 144,5 110.0 35.0
organizations at the national level and integrated them at the enterprise level 
in order to deactivate their potential of centralized power of organized labor, 
the coalition entitled the zaibatsu to maintain relative autonomy vis-à-vis the 
bureaucratic primacy. One of classic corporatist products in this period was 
the establishment of the Association for Harmony and Conciliation (Kyocho-
kai) which was launched by the combined initiative of private business leaders 
and the Ministry of Home Affairs for the purpose of the harmonization of 
the interests of labor and management.
Likewise, the corporatist coalition in the post-war period was organized 
under the domination of the powerful Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) and its associated business sectors because the machinery 
for consensus in economic and industrial policies worked far more effectively 
than it did for social and environmental policies.29 Along with Japanese eco-
nomic success, changes in international conditions such as the liberalization 
of trade, foreign investment and technology transfer led big businesses to arm 
themselves with a more autonomous stance towards the attempts of reincor-
poration by the state. However, labor’s position in this corporatist mediation 
remained marginalized similarly as it had been in the prewar period. 
One of plausible accounts for the reproduction of corporatism-without-labor 
in the post-war period can be found in the notion of “reciprocal consent” 
in which firms give the state jurisdiction over markets in return for their 
continuing control of those markets.30 Such a close reciprocity between the 
state bureaucracy and big business resulted in minimizing the space for 
incorporating organized labor at the national level in this quasi-corporatist 
concertation, thereby confining the post-war patterns of industrial relations 
to the labor-management relationship at the individual plant level. More 
precisely, Kent Calder in his seminal book, Crisis and Compensation, notes 
two interesting trends important for understanding these post-war labor 
dynamics – the absence of sustained conflict over workplace organizations 
despite the varieties and disparities: “private-sector labor, under the pres-
sure of technological change and the growing export reliance of Japanese 
industry after the 1973 oil shock, forged closer ties with both management 
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and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to protect its economic posi-
tion; more militant public-sector labor was destroyed as a political force by 
the mid-1980s through extensive privatization.”31
Pattern for Social Contracts    
The overriding pattern of negotiating social contracts in the post-war Japan 
can be, by and large, divided into two categories: disuniting organized labor 
at the national level; and encouraging labor-management negotiations at 
the enterprise level. As for the national-level negotiations, the conservative 
coalition endeavored to divide organized labor and to foster labor move-
ments that supported a capitalist system geared towards higher levels of 
productivity and rapid growth.32 For example, the LDP’s governments tried 
to isolate and enfeeble the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions (Sōhyō) 
even though Sōhyō abandoned its focus on Marxist political struggle in prefer-
ence for economic unionism during the mid-1950s. The conservative refused 
to recognize Sōhyō’s federations as negotiating agents in the annual spring 
offensives (shuntō), which Sōhyō first coordinated in 1955. Furthermore, the 
conservative coalition discouraged the formation of peak labor organiza-
tions at the national level by emphasizing a pattern of interaction between 
the private-sector unions (or enterprise-level unions) and the conservative 
coalition that continued into the 1990s. With regard to negotiations at the 
enterprise level, cooptation has been the dominant feature of labor unions, 
leaving workers without institutionalized, significant representation in 
federation or peak organization.33 “Welfare corporatism”, articulated by 
Ronald Dore, in this sense, was another sophisticated expression of labor’s 
voice and benefits at the enterprise level, but without reference to the more 
salient functions of federation at the national level, and without attention to 
labor’s role in negotiating adjustment strategies for Japan’s changing politi-
cal economy.34 
Still Without Labor? 
Some specialists on Japan have recently argued that labor now has substan-
tial and increasing national influence not captured by “corporatism-with-
out-labor.”35 Entering the 1980s, labor has been incorporated in tripartite 
conferences with the government and industry to discuss important social 
and economic issues, and labor federations have gained a more prominent 
position within industries in the sense that a new national federation, the 
Rengo, has consolidated nearly two-thirds of organized labor under one peak 
organization.36 Notwithstanding labor’s increasing influence on the tripar-
tite negotiation process, it is premature to conclude that Japan’s corporatist 
Yale Journal of International Affairs 
    
86
taekyoon kim
governance can be defined as a typical concept of the tripartite structure in 
which labor is entitled to enjoy a full partnership equal to the other play-
ers. Rather, as Dennis McNamara claims, changes in Japan’s labor politics 
brought about “limited inclusion, corporatism with labor but without the 
codetermination and proactive representation enjoyed by organized labor 
in Germany.”37 
The Development of Corporatism in Contemporary Korea
Authoritarian Economic Development and State Intervention in Labor 
During the period of authoritarian developmental states in the 1960s and 
1970s, the introduction of social dialogue with labor for promoting workers’ 
rights would not be possible as rapid economic growth was supported by 
authoritarian labor control, which squeezed maximum productivity out of 
workers.39 Such a structural affinity between an export promotion strategy 
and labor repression prevented organized labor from expanding its activities, 
and kept the number of labor strikes extremely low even in the face of exter-
nal oil shocks in the mid-1970s (see Table 2). For a long period, authoritarian 
governments prior to the democratic transition banned enterprise unions 
from engaging in collective bargaining. Instead, the Labor-Management Co-
operative Council (Nosahyobuich’e, or LMCC) was set up at local workplaces 
to deal with working conditions and grievance settlement.40 The Ministry 
of Labor (MOL) forced every workplace to organize monthly meetings of 
the LMCC, which was composed of managers and worker representatives, 
and mandated to report on its discussions and decisions to the govern-
ment. The MOL’s direct intervention in labor-management relations at the 
local workplace had been deepened not only by guiding and regulating the 
LMCC and but also by directing guidelines on state policies to all factories. 
Throughout the period of economic take-off, the state’s dominance in state-
society relations retarded the formation of the national-level federation of 
organized labor, thereby locking wage negotiations into the LMCC at the 
local workplaces.41 
Democratization and the Emergence of Quasi-Corporatism  
  
The democratic transition from authoritarian rule in June 1987 was a critical 
juncture where the strong state was bound to respond to the politicization of 
organized labor and its associated dramatic changes in industrial relations in 
the wake of people’s uprising in civil society. A large number of strikes took 
place shortly after 1987, entailing number of workers involved in strikes and 
lost days due to strikes had rapidly increased, as Table 2 demonstrates.42 Then, 
all three indicators related to the strength of the labor force in the 1990s had 
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Table 2.  Strikes and Lock-outs in Korea, 1970-2000112
1970 1980 1987 1990 1997 1998 2000
Number of strikes 
& lock-outs 4 206 3,617 322 78 129 250
Workers involved 
(thousands) 0.5 49.0 934.9 133.9 43.9 146.1 178.0
Work-days not 
worked (thousands) - 61.3 6,946.9 4,487.2 444.7 1,452.1 1,893.6
dropped until the outbreak of the financial crisis of 1997 when increasing 
frequencies of labor disputes were witnessed once again. These two historical 
events – democratization of 1987 and the financial crisis of 1997 – triggered 
the rapid growth of organized labor, and at the same time the state was ex-
posed to an unfavorable situation wherein it became imperative for the it to 
prepare and implement institutional devices for corporatist intermediation 
to discuss labor problems and reach consensus on cooperative solutions for 
those issues. 
Contrary to Japan’s long experience of corporatist governance, the germ of 
corporatism in Korea first emerged in the nine years after the democratic 
transition of 1987. To deal with a heightened challenge from organized la-
bor in the democratized society, the Kim Young Sam government launched 
an ad hoc quasi-corporatist negotiation, the Reform Committee for Labor-
Management Relations (Nosagwangye gaehyok wiwonhoe, or RCLMR) in April 
1996.43 The RCLMR can be identified with a quasi-corporatist apparatus 
in that the government did not participate directly in this negotiation, but 
played a significant role in persuading both sides of labor and capital into 
sitting together at the RCLMR. The RCLMR can also be seen as a ‘makeshift’ 
body designed for interest intermediation owing to the fact that its status 
was not that of a standing institution protected by the statutory legislation, 
but a temporary presidential advisory committee that was scheduled to 
be disbanded in February 1998. The results of negotiations between two 
labor federations – Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (Minjunoch’ong, 
or KCTU) and Federation of Korean Trade Unions (Han’guk noch’ong, or 
FKTU) – and two industrial representatives – Korea Employers Federation 
(kyongch’ong, or KEF) and Federation of Korea Industries (Chonkyonryon, or 
FKI) – produced an agreement on the revision of the Labor Law.44 However, 
in December 1996, the ruling Grand National Party (GNP) rushed the labor 
bill amended differently from the agreed version in the RCLMR through 
the National Assembly. This legislative fraud provoked a storm of general 
strikes across the country, undermining the conservative’s attempt to neutral-
ize and control strong organized labor.45 Subsequently, the quasi-corporatist 
dialogue of the RCLMR came to a complete standstill, and the government 
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accepted militant labor protests for revising the faulty labor law and passed 
a new labor law in March 1997. The pendulum of the power balance of state-
society relations has since swung back towards organized labor and its key 
national federations.  
The Financial Crisis and Corporatism-without-Capital?    
The outbreak of the financial crisis at the end of 1997 and its following struc-
tural adjustment conditioned by the IMF bailout prompted the democratic 
Kim Dae Jung government in January 1998 to undertake the corporatist ar-
rangement of the Tripartite  Commission (Nosajongwiwonhoe, or TC) consisting 
of organized labor (KCTU and FKTU), the business coalition (FKI and KEF), 
the government, and some political parties. The introduction of the TC in 
the post-crisis society implied that the government discarded its tradition of 
repressive labor policies, and advanced corporatist solutions as the logical 
outgrowth of its three-way reconciliation between the developmental thesis 
in the past and the external pressure of neo-liberal reforms in the present.46 
The most salient characteristic of Korea’s corporatism in this period stems 
from the TC’s underlying motivation that the major target which the gov-
ernment intended to accommodate through this corporatist intermediation 
was more likely to be organized labor, rather than big business. Given that 
the main victim groups of the economic crisis were the labor and middle 
class, the government was forced to address the concerns of the laborers 
– lay-offs and the sharp fall in real wages, caused by a series of structural 
adjustment policies – rather than the capitalists. The business sector, particu-
larly chaebols, was the target for restructuring, but workers at the workplaces 
were victimized in the process of reforming the structures of chaebols. The 
militancy of labor federations, which has been greatly expanded since the 
general strikes of early 1997, also made the Kim administration far more 
susceptible to aggressive challenge from organized labor in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis.47 As a result, the government first started to persuade 
both national centres – the KCTU and FKTU – into being partners of the 
TC, in exchange for delaying the legislation concerning lay-offs and allow-
ing labor representatives to propose and discuss chaebol reforms and social 
security nets for workers. 
As for negotiated agendas of the TC (Table 3), most decisions on each issue 
proposed by both organized labor, especially the KCTU, and the government 
were made by the direct concertation between labor and the government at 
the official meetings of the TC. Except for job security protection, the gov-
ernment accepted, in part or in whole, labor’s requests in all other agendas 
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under the condition that organized labor would cooperate with the state in 
the area of the legalization of lay-offs, as well as the promotion of elasticity in 
the labor market. Eventually, on 19 February 1998, the tripartite dialogue for 
social integration announced a social pact – the so-called “2.19 Pact” – aimed 
to overcome the economic crisis under the pledge of labor’s cooperation 
for this national slogan. However, this tripartite corporatism, despite the 
establishment of the TC as a standing committee protected by the law, has 
been running on a rocky road on account of continuous tension between the 
progressive KCTU and the relatively conservative FKTU.  These differences 
have prevented organized labor from being united as one strong voice.48 
It is notable that capital’s voice regarding neo-liberal reforms and lay-offs 
had seldom been included throughout the process of this corporatist inter-
mediation. One of the clear reasons for the exclusion of capital can be found 
in the fact that the government and labor representatives assumed that the 
private business sector should take responsibilities for the social fallout of 
the economic crisis, so that the business sector would be in close cooperation 
with the results negotiated between the state and organized labor within the 
TC. In addition, the presence of weak capital in the TC reflects the political 
strategy of the state to incorporate the militant labor federations into the 
corporatist institutional arrangement. 
However, corporatism with the weak representation of capital does not 
simply mean a forceful exclusion of capital, just as the Japanese corporatist 
coalition has done to organized labor. Rather, it involves a voluntary denial or 
Table 3.  Results Negotiated between the Government and Organized 
Labor in 1998123
Main Agendas KCTU’s Proposal Government’s Proposal Final Agreements 
	Lay-offs    Request of institu-
tional compensa-
tion.
No plans for institutional 
benefits regarding lay-
offs. 
Agreed to discuss further 
how to prevent abuse of 
lay-offs.
	Reduction 
of working 
time 
40 hours per week 
from 2000. 
Suggested this issue to 
be discussed within the 
Tripartite Commission.
Agreed to reduce working 
hours to 40 per week from 
2000. 
	Job security 
agreements 
Request for con-
cluding legal acts 
concerning job 
security in every 
industrial sector. 
Neutralized the labor’s 
pressure by focusing on 
the possible problems 
caused by private firms 
firing workers illegally. 
No agreement reached.
	Illegal 
measures 
against 
workers
Strict legal actions 
protecting workers 
needed. 
Promised to prepare strict 
regulations and instruc-
tions for workers’ protec-
tion. 
Agreed to launch a special 
subcommittee within the 
Tripartite  Commission. 
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retreat of the business sector itself. According to the TC’s internal documents, 
the business sector failed to implement (or rejected) more than 87 percent of 
the tasks (13 out of 15) assigned by the TC, which was much higher than the 
failure rate of the KCTU – around 60 percent (54 out of 90).50 Some Korean 
scholars also criticize that weak representation of business groups within 
the TC originated from their deliberate dual strategy: they remained reactive 
partners in order to achieve the social pact allowing lay-offs and a flexible 
labor market, whereas they remained passive outsiders when the TC dealt 
with labor rights such as job security, the protection of collective bargaining 
and so on.51 All in all, the overall profile of Korea’s corporatism in the post-
crisis years can be identified with “corporatism-without-capital”, whether 
the weak position of capital was exclusively set up by the state or skillfully 
pursued by the business sector. 
Concluding Remarks
 
This paper has undertaken a macro-comparative sketch of the two East 
Asian outliers – Korea and Japan – in dealing with labor within the frame-
work of corporatism. A short review on distinctive patterns of state-society 
relations was utilized as the stepping stone to a more effective comparison, 
particularly on the part of labor’s position vis-à-vis the state in the tripartite 
intermediation. As figure 1 summarizes, the weak representation of labor in 
the corporatist negotiation comes up with the state-directed path of industrial 
relations in which the negotiation for social contracts can be usually made 
only at the enterprise level and exceptionally allowed at the national level 
when international weakness or external crises presses the state to co-opt 
some organized labor. Typically, this mode of corporatist structures accounts 
for the Japanese case under the heading of “corporatism-without-labor.” 
On the opposite end of the spectrum of state-society relations, the militant 
organized labor plays an important role in organizing a corporatist arrange-
ment consisting of the state and the weak presence of the business sector. 
With regard to the pattern of negotiating social contracts, the strong labor 
thesis promotes a dual structure: wage negotiations at the enterprise level 
and social dialogue for macro social labor issues within a standing, statutory 
institution. The contemporary Korean experience of corporatism after the 
economic crisis of 1997 satisfies this type of corporatist governance, which can 
be called “corporatism-without-capital.” Although these Asian cases show 
different paths of the development of corporatist variants, the underlying 
grounds can be shared with each other in terms of state initiatives of coordi-
nating organized labor and capital and the utilization of corporatism as an 
institutional form for interest intermediation among three social partners. 
If the notion of “corporatism-without-capital” succeeds in describing 
Japan
(Corporatism-without-Labor)
	Weak representation of labor 
unions
	Internal negotiation of social 
contracts at the enterprise level 
	Ad hoc basis of the tripartite 
concertation at the national level 
	Stability in industrial relations
Korea
(Corporatism-without-Capital)
	Strong representation of labor 
unions 
	Dual structure of negotiations: wage 
negotiation at the enterprise level 
and macro-labor policy concertation 
at the tripartite committees.  
	The standing commission for the 
tripartite concertation at the national 
level 
	Shaky foundations on industrial 
relations 
Similarities 
	State-structured incentives to neutralize organized labor 
	Institutionalization of intermediate concertation 
Winter 2008 91
Corporatist governanCe 
retreat of the business sector itself. According to the TC’s internal documents, 
the business sector failed to implement (or rejected) more than 87 percent of 
the tasks (13 out of 15) assigned by the TC, which was much higher than the 
failure rate of the KCTU – around 60 percent (54 out of 90).50 Some Korean 
scholars also criticize that weak representation of business groups within 
the TC originated from their deliberate dual strategy: they remained reactive 
partners in order to achieve the social pact allowing lay-offs and a flexible 
labor market, whereas they remained passive outsiders when the TC dealt 
with labor rights such as job security, the protection of collective bargaining 
and so on.51 All in all, the overall profile of Korea’s corporatism in the post-
crisis years can be identified with “corporatism-without-capital”, whether 
the weak position of capital was exclusively set up by the state or skillfully 
pursued by the business sector. 
Concluding Remarks
 
This paper has undertaken a macro-comparative sketch of the two East 
Asian outliers – Korea and Japan – in dealing with labor within the frame-
work of corporatism. A short review on distinctive patterns of state-society 
relations was utilized as the stepping stone to a more effective comparison, 
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Figure 1.  Different Modes of Corporatist Governance in Korea and Japan
Weak                  Organizational strength of civil society (labor)               Strong 
labor’s mode of interest representation within Korea, its significance for 
both governance of organized labor and corporatist theory may well stretch 
beyond Korea. A new framework in which to assess some distinctive pat-
terns of corporatism in industrial relations offers a significant heuristic tool 
to compare dynamics of interest representation and the state’s response to 
organized labor. The Korean case of corporatist negotiation is going to defy 
easy categorization along a continuum of the neocorporatist formation in 
Western societies, just as the Japanese case has done so. However, the thesis 
of corporatism-without-capital is required to have more empirical tests and 
verifications in the case of Korea and elsewhere in Asia or other continents 
as well, before it opens a new dimension of societal corporatism between 
strong organized labor and the weak representation of capital. Y
-Shreya Basu served as lead editor for this article.
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